The Need of Introducing Naga History in School & College Textbooks

(A Political Perspective)
– R. B. Thohe Pou
There are many books written on Nagas by foreigners, Indians and Naga scholars. However, it is quite bizarre that Naga history is still not written even for school and college textbooks. The Nagas want to be an independent country but whether it is really desired or not, it is high time to write Naga history and introduce in schools, colleges and universities textbooks

Today one of the main reasons of not being active in mass participation in Naga National Movement (NNM) is due to people’s bankruptcy in Naga historical background. If we know the Naga history, we cannot resist from supporting the NNM. I have got lots of questions that rise in my mind when I think the need of writing Naga history and introducing Naga History as school and college textbooks. Some of the most important questions are – Is there any nation in this world without any written history? Why Naga history need to be written and included in schools, colleges and universities syllabus in Nagalim? Why is it important to know Naga history? Do you think there is less mass participation and support in Indo-Naga talks due to lack of knowledge in Naga history? How many of our Naga educated people know in details about the Naga history? Why many educated Nagas are poor in Naga history? Do you ever come across any word mentioning about the Naga history in Indian history? Do you think it is high time to write Naga history for school and college textbooks? What is our government, Naga historians and scholars were doing in last 50 years? Why none of our Naga historians, scholars and leaders realize the importance of introducing Naga history in school and college? What are the main obstacles that we the Nagas could not write the Naga history and have Naga history in school and college textbooks?

In this article, I may not be able to answer all the above questions. However I believe that the government, Naga philosophers, thinkers, writers and leaders would answer all the above questions. We, the Nagas have enough historians, philosophers, scholar and writers. Nevertheless, it seems the Nagas are so callous to write Naga history. I am sure that it would not be an easy task to write Naga history but there are copious of documents and books, which we can write the Naga history. We the Nagas study Indian history, but do we study Naga history in school or college level? I personally feel that if the Naga history had been introduced in school and college textbooks in 1950’s or at least by 1980’s, it would have awoken the hearts of the educated Naga people with alacrity to participate and extend more solidarity to Naga National Movement or Indo-Naga peace talks.
Today, many educated Naga people have no inspiration and conviction and not ardently supporting the NNM due to lack of Naga historical knowledge. There are many foreigners and Indians who know Naga history better than the Nagas in Nagalim. Unless we know the Naga history, it will be difficult for active mass participation in Nagas struggle for integration or sovereignty. There are many educated Naga people who are dithering to participate in NNM because they have not even browse the Naga history; they are not aware of the Nagas right to self-determination. How can we anticipate the layman to know the Naga history when the educated people do not know the Naga history and are bewildered?
In the present scenario, the urgent need in Nagalim is to impart the knowledge of Naga history to the mass. There is not any specific written Naga history book. However we can read from different books and we need to have lots of seminars on Naga history among the educated Naga people also along with the laymen. The Naga Civil Society (NCS) are actively involved in spreading the Naga issue to many civil societies in India through documentary movies and printed books especially to the non-Nagas. I am sure that it would definitely a help to the civil societies to understand more about the Naga issues and problems. Recently I got a VCD (documentary movie, Naga Story-the other side of silence?) from Mr. Shekho George (a civil society active member) and I have screened that documentary movie in Interdisciplinary Discussion Group, University of Pune and a discussion based on that documentary movie was discussed. There were lots of responses from the imminent Professors, Research scholars and other students. I personally feel that all the educated Naga people should have thorough knowledge on Naga history or whatever we know about Naga history, we should pass on to the Naga friends and non-Naga friends.
There is little written Naga history for school textbooks in Nagaland State but that is not enough and we need to include more even for school level and include the whole history in college level. It is very late by now to introduce the Naga history in school and college level. However, ‘Better late than never’. We do not know how long it will take to solve the Naga political problem. But I am optimistic that Naga problem will be solved in our life time or generation. Even if the Naga problem is solved and Nagalim becomes an independent country or what ever it may be, the Naga history cannot be snubbed and throw into dustbin. It is high time that we the Naga scholars need to write Naga history for school and college textbooks. If our senior Naga writers and government of Nagaland would have taken the initiative to write the Naga history earlier, by now all the educated Naga people might have good historical background.
Today if we ask the graduate or Post Graduate student about the Nine Points Hydari Agreement, s/he may say, “I am not aware of that Agreement”. Recently, the Naga Students Union, Pune (NSUP), held their 24th Annual Literary and Cultural Meet on 26th January 2005, and in that Quiz Competition, a question was asked, “When was the Shillong Accord made?”, the quiz participants answered, in 1962, 1963, 1972 etc. Finally the question was passed to the audience. Then some of us raised our hands and I said, “It was in 1975”. However the Quizmaster said “Sorry, it was in 1965”. Then I was little bit embarrassed. I went home to check again from the book and I found that the Shillong Accord was made on 10-11 November 1975. See – this is how some of our educated people have the knowledge about the Naga history. I doubt that many of us know when the British first came to Naga Hills, Formation of Naga Club, NNC, Nine Points Agreement, Shillong Accord, Breaking up of NSCN, ongoing peace talks etc.
There are many books written on Nagas, however only the Naga writers, scholars, leaders and very few people who are interested in Naga struggle for sovereignty read the books. One of the important reasons or attributes that the school or college going students do not read the Naga book is that all the books are not easily available to all the people; it is mostly confined in some good institutes or Universities in India. I am from a remote village, Senapati District Manipur and I was not aware of the Naga history before I take up my PhD research work. And like me there are more than 90% of the total populations of Nagas who do not get the facility to read the books on Nagas, which is written by foreigners, Indians and Naga scholars. The price of the book on Nagas or any book on Tribal is relatively costlier than the school or college textbooks. We the Nagas or Indigenous people are poor and there are many students who do not have money to purchase their school or college textbooks so there is no question arise to buy and read the book on Nagas. I think the best way for all the Nagas to know or read the Naga history is to write the Naga history and introduce in school and college textbooks, so that all the books are available, affordable and accessible to all the people. I can confidently say that unless, we know the Naga history, we cannot expect active mass participation in Naga National Movement. As a Naga it is a great shame incase we do not know anything about the Naga history.
In conclusion, I would like to suggestl the Government of Nagaland, Naga Hoho, NSF, Naga Mother’s Association, UNC and all the Naga leaders to consider the importance and need to write and introduce in school textbooks. Secondly, I would like to suggest conducting lots of seminars on Naga history with the Nagas and non-Nagas in different cities, towns and villages. If the government of Nagaland, Naga Hoho, NSF,UNC, etc feel the need to write and introduce the Naga history in school and college textbooks, I am sure there will be some people like me who would love to invest their knowledge, time and energy to write Naga history for school and college textbooks.
Note: (This article was earlier published in in Feb. 2005)

Divide and Rule: how to reconcile and unite? History of state formation

Continued from previous post.

Democratic principles were alien to him because he came from a tribe, Pangmi, closely associated to Konyaks, which leaders ruled supremely. He was above critique and so with the Eastern Command under his wing, he did what he felt like doing. When called for an NSCN meeting in Eastern Nagaland for which the other leaders had travelled wide and, under the guise of darkness he attacked their camp and killed many NSCN men instantly, many more survivors of this treacherous attack were on the run for safety, his men in persecution. Th. Muivah among then narrowly escaped the onslaught. That Khaplang could do this was made possible by S.C. Jamir who had command over the Assam Rifles and access to funding all kinds of operations. S.C. Jamir in the hands of the Indians masterminded Khaplang’s moves and so it was the Indians once more who were able to disunite the Nagas.

Though they thought, 1988, the Nagas were beaten for good; they had to learn the hard way that united Nagas do not easily give up. Consequently, after 1988 the war went on and while Khaplang frustrated the initiatives of the NSCN, those who frustrated by the hardships and sacrifices the NSCN required of them became renegades and defected to Khaplang, Yet the NSCN grew stronger nevertheless and the Government of India realized that this was the force to deal with for a solution and when the generals stated the war could not be won, they decided to seek a ceasefire.

Looking back on this background while reviewing the Peace Talks one cannot but conclude that the Government of India talks with a split tongue: officially, so on the table, it speaks of an honorable solution through peaceful means, while under it, it works hard to frustrate that goal. The last round of talks in Amsterdam from 7 to 9 December is a shining example of this. With the NSCN-Khaplang nexus on the table the talks the Indians avoided talking of a future relationship again. This was remarkable if not symptomatic and significant and  because during the former talks in Delhi, the same representatives of the Prime Minister of India announced that, during the next talks in Amsterdam, they would come up with an interim proposal. Though they did not elaborate on what this ‘interim proposal’ would be, the Nagas knew that any proposal to solve the conflict has to begin with the first step.

That first step had to undo what has been done to the Nagas, in other words the first step to reunify Naga areas which were so harshly separated by states and countries. “Yet”, said Th. Muivah in an interview preceding theAmsterdamtalks, “we understand the predicament of the Indians. They have their opposition to deal with and these are like hawks. On the other hand elections are near so the Congress Government likes to live up to its promises and by settling the Naga conflict once and for all, so they score. But then, this government is weak, it does not dare to take decisions with far reaching implications. This Government is afraid; it has no backbone, so I would not be surprised if their first step regarding this interim proposal is to allow the Nagas in other states than Nagaland to have more autonomy. They are right too in that case, because if they do that, it is a good sign. It means they are serious with us. They will have to go against the interests of the states who incidentally have no rights to our land, like we have no right to the land of other peoples living in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh andAssam. So, when they see that as an interim proposal we will say yes, but as a first step to an honorable solution.”

Stalling for time to wear out the Nagas, or a genuine discomfort on how to solve this conflict without angering anyone: opposition, the states concerned especially Manipur which rose violently over a minor snag in the ceasefire? “The Government of India cannot be but insincere. We understand that but we cannot tolerate indefinite stalling. So, I have told them again about Naga History and what this could mean should there be no resort but to resume the war. I said to them: the Nagas will never give up, no matter how much money you pour in getting at those who will ‘temporarily’ support you. Ask your Naga supporters whom you pay what they will choose in the end: will they choose forIndiaor will they choose to be independent?”, I asked them. “They were silent but said that they needed more time to work out the interim proposal they had promised and they apologized.”

That the Indians find it hard to come up with anything at all is obvious when one considers it just wants any people to abide by their rule. That nature was blatantly exposed when an extension of the ceasefire with the Boros of Assam was at stake. First of all the Indians wanted the Boros to sign an agreement containing the precondition that the talks were to be held ‘within the Indian constitution’. Secondly they accused the National Democratic Front of Boroland, NDFB of being the instigator of the Bangla-Boro clashes in Udailguri which left close to a hundred people dead and thirdly they held the same organization accounted for the serial bomb blasts in places inAssam. Mounting pressure bestowed on the Boros, who are similar in heritage and aspiration as the Nagas, resulted in the Government of India dictating rather than seeking an honorable solution for the Indo-Boro conflict. It wanted a solution of its own making. And, effectively this just meant: stop talking, lay down arms and sign to be part ofIndia. Because some of the Boro leaders succumbed under this pressure, they indeed signed and a split, similar to the one in the Naga ranks, became fact. But the Nagas, though also to an extent divided, still stand strong and consequently, unless in the foreseeable future the Government of India comes up with a genuine ‘Interim Proposal’, the future of India and Nagaland will be one of bloodshed. The Indians will attack and the Nagas will defend their stand. In the fall out the Northeast will be burning again, but with a difference.

This time around India cannot conceal what it does; it cannot to keep the then full blown conflict secret anymore. With many means of communication means available today, not this time it can keepIndiaas well as the world oblivious of what it unleashes. The International Community, the world will come know of the suppression which already in the past resulted in land grabbing, torture, rape extra judicial killings and blatant extermination, in short genocide. The Nagas will spread the news on atrocities being committed while fighting for their cultural and personal survival. Many stories of these atrocities of the past committed in the fifties and sixties have been documented by the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights, stories only old Nagas can still tell.

In conclusion, the Indo-Naga Peace Process has been one of the Mouse taking to the Giant, or in Naga Christian terms, the story of David and Goliath talking peace. And though the Goliath now knows what David is going through it cannot and will not grant it the freedom David so dearly desires. Almost sixty years of war of which, since the last ceasefire, 13 years of talking led to the Government of India doing nothing to solve the conflict. Instead it still uses sheer force. If nothing changes eventually more and more Nagas, like former Chief Ministers of Nagaland and Manipur respectively S.C. Jamir and Reishing Keishing will feel that there is nothing to gain when the conflict is prolonged indefinitely but destruction and death and are pressed to accept anything the Government of India is willing to hand to them. Is this whatIndiais banking on? IsIndiabanking on the time the seemingly eternal life of the Naga Leaders will come to an end? Is the hidden agenda ofIndiato wear out the Nagas out so they will come to accept the inevitable?

Though getting old, Khadao Yantam vice president, recently died, the Naga leaders are still vibrant. Is India reasoning and taking its chances that next generation of leaders may be less competent, less convinced, have less charisma, are more corruptible, are susceptible to the reasoning of Indian leaders?  Indians may think that these Naga men and women don’t have the integrity and credibility of the old leaders and patiently wait while they scheme. They keep on pouring money to destabilize and confuse. They supply weapons to renegades who committed crimes they cannot conceal. They oppress their own so that the Indian Government can blame it all on the Naga infighting.

Interesting observations and questions perhaps, but they are of no significance if the Nagas do not bow but make stronger impact. When the Nagas apply more substantive clout, militarily, politically home and abroad the talks will become more equal and David will use his wits, not to fell Goliath but to open substantive talks for a future and mutual relationship. How they can do that? How can a mouse put pressure on an elephant? How can David rise to the level of Goliath? One mouse cannot, but when David had thousands of mice on his side the situation changes dramatically; when thousands become millions, the international public, no elephant will be able to sustain. Goliath has to come to the level of David to talk and decide on the future of the Nagas, a future which has the right to self determination secured. How it all began and how it arrived at this juncture, for a good understanding of the conflict let’s review the History. To be concluded.

Extracted from the book:  Between David and Goliath -the Conflict and Peace Talks between Nagaland and India: The Indo-Naga experience by Frans Welman, Amsterdam

Divide and Rule: how to reconcile and unite? Frans Welman

Divide and Rule: how to reconcile and unite?

History of state formation

From Naga History it is evident that the Naga Peoples organically had nothing to do with the Indian subcontinent. They had no trade relations or were in touch by other modes of communication. Only because the British partially incorporated the Nagas and their lands they are now part of the Union of India. Also, the Nagas have no Cultural, Religious, Linguistic or Historical relations or affinities withIndia; in fact they only traded and communicated with their surrounding peoples. And so it was the British who made them part of their South Asian, their Indian Empire.

Though the Nagas submitted their 31 points program for honorable solution years ago so far the Government of India only agreed to one of the points, one considered to be a milestone for the Naga Peoples as a nation. Because it confirms their stand and is the basis for their desire to be sovereign; through this point ‘the unique history and situation’ as it was put in writing was recognized by the Indian side. It officially and meant the right to self determination was de facto acknowledged and thus for the Nagas this recognition opened the way to real and now amicable negotiations on the kind of relationship between the two nations. The hopes of the Nagas vanished into thin air again when the new Congress Government was installed. Though the BJP Government signed the communiqué on ‘unique history and situation’ it did not follow up on it and could not because unexpectedly the Congress Government rose to power when snap elections called for by a buoyant BJP was lost by that party.

Thinking this would make the Nagas sail easier through the peace process, as back in 1995 it was under the Congress Government that the secret talks for a ceasefire were held and concluded with its signing in 1997, proved to be a little too premature. Still, because of the recognition of the unique history questions like this were on many a Naga mind and lips: “Could this new Congress Government live up to expectations? Would it indeed strive for the honorable solution so dearly wished by the Naga Civil Society? Would the Indian military leave Nagaland any time soon?”

At the time of this hope rising and hidden from public view other forces were at work, forces with had only one aim in mind, the successful aim of the Indian Intelligence Services. It was their aim to disrupt the unity of the Nagas so resistance would fracture. The Nagas on the other hand, instead of using their intelligence to promote their cause internationally, but applied resources and time to stamp out dissension, this way attempting to prevent the Naga society from being confused about who did what, for what purpose but also to show who really represents them.


To understand this huge divide and rule project again History is the important factor. When today Naga Organizations claim to represent the Nagas it would suffice to check their credentials against their historical record. So, when the Naga National Council states it is the only true Naga Organization to represent all Nagas one has to remember the Shillong Accord of 1975 and its implications and repercussions before considering it to be a true representative. And so this question unavoidably rises: What is this Shillong Accord. Who instigated it and what did it lead to?

This Accord between India and the Naga National Council signed by some Federal Government members, among which Kevi Yallay, the brother of the NNC president who as an exile lived in London but was very much the president of the NNC, sealed the fate of the Nagas. It stipulated that the Accord had been reached voluntarily and that it was ‘under the Constitution of India’. Though this infamous Shillong Accord was not ratified by the NNC as a whole and A.Z. Phizo did not confirm it either, disarming of the Naga Army was ordered and militia were launched to effectuate disarmament; peace camps were built to house the Naga soldiers who surrendered their arms. One such camp exists to this day.

High ranking NNC leaders were enraged by the signing of the Shillong Accord; they termed it ‘a total sell out’, a total surrender. Some NNC leaders learned about this news while on a mission inChinaand denounced this Accord but pleaded with Phizo, their supreme leader, to denounce it too. He did not but later inLondonis quoted to have said that it was ‘a political game’ being played. Realizing the danger disunity could spawn they wanted to save the NNC and for five years worked on that before they founded it’s successor the National Council of Nagaland, NSCN. In between 1975 and 1980 the militias persecuted anyone who disobeyed the order handing in weapons, arrested those who were unwilling and worse killed them. NNC leaders like Isak Chishi Swu and TH. Muivah, who denounced the Shillong Accord, were also arrested and held captive in a remote area. Held captive by their own people and being threatened with death, they were ordered to dig their own graves, made these NNC leaders realize that the first major schism in the ranks of the Nagas was unavoidable. This fact could only be averted when their captors, called by them Accordists, retraced their steps to denounce the Accord too. They did not, though only years and decades later some signatories, one even on his deathbed, did so. This schism in the ranks of the Nagas festered and still permeates through all political activities.  That schism is still an open and infected wound today, its puss influencing the state of affairs.

Though the Indians masterminded the Shillong Accord to their surprise it had far more consequences than they ever anticipated. Their planned schism in Naga Society was now fact; divide and rule worked; it had worked even all the way to those who were the backbone of the NNC. The Indian Intelligence knew then that only through a revolution against the leadership of the NNC, read Phizo, could the Naga stand be saved and the national issue be salvaged. In the sixties already the Indians tried to separate the Nagas by letting those who were in favor of a Naga settlement under the constitution but with a state of their own call the shots. The Naga Peoples Council then backed up the forming of Nagaland State which was carved out of Assam and separated Nagas now living in the other new states in the Northeast of India like Arunachal Pradesh,  the remainder of Assam itself and of course Manipur.NagalandStatein 1963 was born with Naga state politicians elected by the people. Elected? Officially yes, but unofficially the practice of corruption was born too and so state politicians bought votes to gain influence and money later which was being poured in by the Government of India. Corruption was another way of divide and rule, intelligence services knew.

After the first political division of Nagaland intoNagalandState, under the constitution ofIndia, the Shillong Accord and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland took up the struggle where the Nagas of NNC had left off. For years, eight to be precise, the new Naga Forces gained strength, while behind the scenes the divide and rule gaming went on unabated. In 1988, the NSCN split into two Khaplang, until then part of the NSCN, revolted with a coup and formed his own NSCN. From then on till this day there are two rival NSCNs.

Now the question was in what way the divide and rule policy of the Indians was at work in this internal struggle. Was it because Khaplang suspected but did not know that the leaders of the NSCN without him had reached an accord with the Indians and he revolted against that? According to him, yes indeed. According to Isak Chisi Swu and Th. Muivah this was utter nonsense, the opposite was the case and it involved a participant in the formation ofNagalandState, the later Chief Minister S.C. Jamir. Jamir who had long before stated that to be within the Union of India would be the best option for the Nagas. With the eminent help of the Indians he moved heaven and earth to crack down on the Naga Forces and found in Khaplang an ally. But why would Khaplang oblige? Khaplang was dissatisfied with his position in the NSCN. As a renowned leader among his own Eastern Nagalanders, who had a different heritage of leadership compared to most other Naga tribes, could not abide by the rules of the revolutionary Government he agreed, not even when this was necessary for the formation of a Naga Nation.

Extracted from the book:  Between David and Goliath -the Conflict and Peace Talks between Nagaland and India: The Indo-Naga experience by Frans Welman, Amsterdam

To be continued…

Nagalim: Indo-Naga Cease Fire Analysis

Tuesday, 19 January 2010
Exploration of policy alternatives/ recommendations and strategies for their implementation.

Below is an article published by Naga International Support Centre :


I.         Introduction

II.        Achievement

III.       Problems with the current approach

IV.       Why GOI is interested in Cease-fire

V.        What Nagas need to know

VI.       Options

VII.      Recommendations

VIII.     Conclusion

Indo-Naga Cease fire (1997-2009)

I. Introduction: The historic Indo-Naga peace talks held on 31 July 2007 at Circuit House, Dimapur extended the cease-fire between the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) for an indefinite period of time, albeit with the focal condition that it is “subject to the progress of the talks”. The implication of this agreement is that any slackness on the center’s part would result in the talks being called off at “any time”. The change in the condition of cease-fire has been acclaimed as a tactical move to put pressure on the Government of India to be on their toes. The two sides till now have held 59 rounds of talks both in India and abroad. However, no headway seems to have been made on the core issues. The objective of this paper is to explore a set of policy alternatives/ recommendations and outline a strategy for implementing them. It is also the objective of this paper to expose the mind of the Government of India.

II. Achievements:

Though the Cease-fire has not brought any substantive progress on the core issues, it has created a conducive ground situation for conntinued engagement between India and the Nagas represented by the collective leadership. A relatively peaceful law and order and security situation has been prevailing not only within the territory of Nagaland state where cease-fire is formally effective but in the adjoining states as well since the declaration of cease-fire in 1997. The Naga collective leadership has proved to the Government of India and the outside world that Nagas are peace-loving people and want to resolve this long-standing issue peacefully. During this period the collective leadership has explicitly made it clear to the Government of India that resolving this issue will be to their mutual benefit. The Government of India seems to have understood what exactly the Nagas want while on its part; it is yet to come up with its position. It will never.
III. Problems with the Current approach:

A press statement issued by the MIP of NSCN (I-M) during the last extension of the cease-fire reportedly had said that its leaders had flayed the Government of India for what was described as “hurting the sentiment of the Nagas”.  Rightly so.  The Government of India has not responded to any of the core proposals made by the Naga leaders despite holding 59 rounds of talks.

For the GoI, it appears imperative to solve the Naga issue while maintaining the country’s territorial integrity. Government of India is aware that it is indispensable to look beyond the Mizoram or Punjab models to find a permanent solution to the Naga problem, but there is no model yet in its mind. Consequently, the Government of India rather than providing a point-to-point answer to the demands of the NSCN (IM) simply states its willingness to solve the crisis. Nevertheless, the perpetual extension of the terms of the cease-fire on the pretext of proper implementation of the agreements through periodic reviews is clearly seen as a ploy of the GOI to buy time in order to bury the peace process under the wrap of time.

On the integration issue, the Government seems to be reluctant to make a commitment because of the serious problems associated with it. None of these states which has naga population are likely to accept the NSCN (IM)’s demand. Even as the talk is between the GOI and the Nagas, the Government is unlikely to cede the territories of other states claimed by the Nagas. The Government of India has been time and again giving assurances to these states that their territorial integrity will be respected (at all cost?). Then the only motive of the GoI, it is speculated, is to extend the term of the cease-fire for as long as possible and sit on it.

In the face of this inbuilt stasis in the peace talks it is suggested that the period of ceasefire must be used to strengthen the Naga issues. A formidable task before the Nagas is emotional integration even before territorial integration is realized. Lamentably, there are no social-political institutions in Naga society adequately equipped that can be tasked to achieving this emotional integration. This is made even more difficult with the emergence of vested interest since the creation of Nagaland State in 1963. The last 50 years have also taught Naga political leaders the comfort of power and money and the art of double speak (Money has been flowing in to Nagaland in the name of curbing insurgency.  Nagaland with a population of 19.88 lakhs (2001) has a budget of 3599 crs (2006-7) compared to Manipuri with a population of 23.88 lakhs with a budget of only 3362 crs). They have not allowed the public to come together by building their own constituents.

It is for a matter of record that Nagas are being administered by four state governments taught by four different educational boards and there is a wide difference in economic and social status of the Nagaland Nagas and the Nagas outside Nagaland. It seems that these fissures have become so deep seated that despite the various integration meetings subsequent to the ongoing peace process, not much headway has been made at the ground level. Quit notices are being issued to members of certain non- Nagaland Naga tribes working in Nagaland even now with disconcerting regularity. Evidently, a lot needs to be done in strengthening the existing institutions to achieve a real integration.

IV. Why GOI is interested in cease-fire

It is important here to delve a little deeper as to why GOI would like to continue the current cease fire as long as possible. The obvious reason of course is GOI has nothing to lose while it has been reaping enormous tactical gains. There are two main reasons: 1. To facilitate GOI’s Look east policy. 2. And through this development process, weaken and disintegrate the cadre and other outfits in the region.

GOI has a huge agenda in the North East states as a land bridge to the ASEAN countries to aggressively push its ‘Look East policy’. The relatively peaceful atmosphere during the peace process has been successfully used to facilitate this policy. In early 1990s India initiated economic liberalization process and simultaneously launched the ‘Look east policy’. ASEAN was then thriving with economic boom-known as ‘Asian Tigers’. This policy was reinforced and intensified by the BJP government and the present UPA government.
1. Look east policy has several components which include political, economic, security and strategic.

i. Political: 1990s saw the need for India to engage with the ASEAN. India moved very fast. India is a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1996 and has acceded to ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), became a summit partner to ASEAN in 2002 and signed the ASEAN-India Partnership for peace, Progress and shard Prosperity in 2004. She is also a founding member of East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2006. India is now closely entwined in ASEAN process. While actively engaging with other ASEAN countries, India is sponsoring many development projects in CLMV (Cambodia, Loas, Myanmar & Vietnam) countries for meaningful integration of these countries with the rest of ASEAN.

ii. Economic: Ever since the launching of India’s Look east policy and the onset of regional integration of Southeast Asia, both India and ASEAN have developed a mutual comprehensive understanding in terms of shared vulnerabilities, shared economic progress and common stake in creating a peaceful and prosperous Asian Economic Community. The signing of the Framework Agreement on comprehensive Economic Cooperation and the signing of an ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) with the combine GDP of 1.5 trillion and a market of 1.5 billion people is the most obvious example of growing synergy between India and ASEAN.

India has been intensifying its trade relation with Myanmar in the recent past because it has some strategic implications for India. Myanmar is the only member of ASEAN that shares a border with India and a greater connectivity with Myanmar would provide India the gateway to ASEAN. Trade relations with Myanmar can also accelerate the development process in Northeast India and thus India is interested to invest in various infrastructure projects in Myanmar

iii. Security & Strategic: The proposed land linkage to the ASEAN countries through India’s North east and Myanmar will give a distinct security and strategic gain to India. The improving infrastructure and up gradation of military facilities will facilitate easy and quick movement of military hardware to the border areas as and when contingencies arise which in turn will largely constraint the free movement of insurgent groups and the conduct of guerilla warfare.

iv. China factor: India has learnt a hard lesson from the loss it had suffered in the early 1990s. While it was giving ideological lecture to the military junta, the Chinese never slept to aggressively push down its influence (political, economic & military) in Myanmar. Now India is struggling hard to somehow compete if not contain that influence. With the Coco Islands on lease from Myanmar, China can access the Indian Ocean and has facilities to not only watch the naval activities on the eastern cost of India but also to spy on India’s missile launching program. China’s influence in Myanmar can disturb India’s maritime strategic calculations as China can access the Arabian Sea via Pakistan’s Gwadar port and the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. In addition, China has also signed an agreement to develop the harbour of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Chinese access to these strategic locations can provide the potential for a maritime encirclement of India by China. China is also assisting Myanmar to develop its naval bases in Sittwe, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyikyan by building radar and refuelling facilities that could help Chinese submarine operations in the Bay of Bengal.
2. Implication to Northeast and Naga movement:

Physical infrastructure in the region will definitely improve because this region has to serve as a land bridge to the east. However, sadly, the inflow of large investment of big capital will also be used for exploiting rich mineral, hydro and bio diversity resources of the region particularly of the Nagas. In this process certain group of people will immensely benefit although the gap between the rich and poor will further widen. The interested group including local politicians will not want to share the benefit with the public in general and with tribes outside Nagaland in particular. The enthusiasm for territorial integration will rock the bottom.  Secondly, as many members of the cadre will be benefitted from this development process as already been seen during the last 10 years of peace process, their love for comfortable civil life will continue to be a huge stumbling block for the movement’s sustenance.
V. What Nagas need to know:

The Nagas need to know that it will be almost impossible for any underground faction to eliminate another faction, partly because every faction has a support base both within and outside Naga territory. All the factions must know by now that there are people within Nagaland/Nagalim who would like to see factional fightings continue so they can continue amassing wealth for themselves. In this the vested interests are in unison with outside forces who wish to divide and rule the nagas.

All the factions should also be aware that unless they come together and deal with the Government of India (GOI) unitedly, separate and piecemeal negotiation will simply give GOI ample time to prepare sophisticated strategies to ensure that Naga political struggle does not progress any further. By now all the factions ought to realize that Assam (Asom), Manipur, and Arunachal, emboldened by the tacit support of GOI, will continue to oppose integration of all contiguous Naga. But what is most appalling is that the Nagas are at war with each other. Let us be very clear about this: the GOI will get serious only when the Nagas are united; until such time they will continue to play politics indefinitely. Time is the essence.

The Nagas need to learn from the very struggle of India for independence against the Britishers. In the struggle for India’s independence, the freedom fighters resorted to different paths- some moderate and the others extreme in the early 20th Century. This differences in approaches (on one side led by Mahatma Gandhi and on the other by Subash Chandra Boss raising his own army outside India and collaborating with the axis power during the World War II.)  continued till the dawn of India’s independence. However, their goal was just one namely, the independence of India. The freedom fighters drained their energies in expelling the external forces and not on eliminating each other. Is there a lesson for us in this?

The Nagas must know that even though armed aggression has stopped during cease-fire a new threat is emerging in the shape of economic offensive, where in the name of development nagas will be integrated and subordinated to mainland India. It is interesting to note that while the peace process is being on, the GoI has intensified its efforts in focusing on the development of the Northeast region. 10 % of the Union budget is allocated for the region while the population and area of the region are mere 3.88% (2001 census) and around 8% respectively. Particularly, the state of Nagaland will be benefiting in the coming years with many developmental and educational projects. The current budget has allocated Rs 700 crores for rail link from Dimapur to Kohima, Nagaland will get its own High Court very soon and its university is being upgraded by opening new engineering college and Medical College while the Nagas living in other states remain marginalized and dejected. Recently two SEZs have been announced. It has been reported that Nagaland has opened up for oil exploration (Champang Oil) that will accrue to the State Government to the tune of US$ 115 million in the coming 3-4 years. While one can understand the reason why NSCN (IM) has become a stakeholder of this project, it casts a doubt as to how it will serve the interest of the Naga movement. Prosperity breeds revolutionary lethargy. Moreover, large investment of big capital inevitably leads to increasing power of money bags, who in the current reality of the sub-continent are from the mainland; it also leads to inflow of skilled and unskilled workforce that too will flow in from the mainland. For instance, Wokha that is the site of hydal project also witnessed the highest growth of population in the decadal census of 1991-2001. What will be the impact of all this on Naga society?
VI. Options

1) Staying on course

The current approach does not seem to be very useful for the furtherance of the cause of the Nagas. Some of the reasons are:

  1. There has not been any forward movement in the core issues proposed by the collective leadership. The reasons may be: a) the proposals put forward by the collective leadership entail a major constitutional changes that no political leaders of any party in India would like to imagine. b) Nagas remain as disunited as ever and Government of India still has enough maneuvering space. c) Any concession to the Nagas will open a Pandora box.
  1. While the talk seems to be facing a wall, the Naga cadre specially, the arm cadre has apparently become complacent after experiencing the comfort of civil life. There have been reports that the instructions for dispersal of government funds in Ukhrul District are flowing from Hebron camp. Will this blur the vision of the middle rung cadre, is a question which needs objective answer. The cadre has also become even more venerable due to their complete exposure to Indian intelligence department over the last more than one decade in terms of the details of their sympathizers, movements, personal contacts. How easy for the GOI to crack down once the peace process ceases.
  1. The peace period has led to disproportionate prosperity of Nagaland without much progress on the core issues. While prosperity of our Naga brethren in Nagaland should not be a cause of envy for others, but when it is used as tool by GOI to blunt the sharpness of Naga nationalism and create friction and discord in Naga polity, this needs to be viewed and judged critically. It is not in the interest of a nation to have half of its populations feasting in the banquette of its enemies.
  1. The current peace process has not brought much internal unity. In fact it has increased competition among the factions to get the attention of the Government of India. NSCN (K) has separately declared cease-fire with the GOI and NNC has been trying to reassert its importance. Much effort to bring together all factions have not achieved anything much. While the NSCN (I-M) is trying to negotiate with the GOI, NSCN (K) has condemned the NSCN (IM) for having dropped sovereignty in the list of its demands. Whereas NSCN (K) has not come up with any proposals for settlement and been dumped by NSCN (I-M) as a stooge in the hands of some politicians who are at loggerhead with the collective leadership. How long will this war of words go on? And who, ultimately benefits?
  1. It may be mentioned here that India has not fought war for the last 35 years now; it is an emerging regional and economic power, a de facto nuclear power and signatory to almost all United Nations Conventions. It has almost all the institutions and mechanism to counter any anti-Indian propaganda. In view of this, it may not be very easy to convince its good will to understand and grant what the Nagas want. India is doing a sleeping act-it is difficult to wake up a person who is not actually sleeping. Granting any concession whatsoever outside the parameter of Indian constitution is more of face loss than gaining international applause for doing democratic charity. J& K, which had special status with separate constitution, separate flag etc. when it began its statehood is today as ordinary as any other state in India. This is the kind of game India is playing with Nagas too.

2) Withdrawal from cease-fire:

Withdrawing from the cease-fire at this juncture is not a viable option either. I do not know the exact strength and preparedness of the cadre. However, it may not be difficult to assume that a) our cadres who are in the camp and in other various mission are not mentally prepared to go underground now. b) Withdrawal from the cease-fire without any tactical preparation will leave the movement in shamble. There is possibility of resistance from some quarter that will be detrimental to the interest of the movement. There is a need to show to the world that the movement can withstand the shift from peace process to any other eventuality. And it appears that it is not ready yet for that.

VII. Recommendations

New approach:

While the ten-year long cease-fire appears to have not produced the desired result, immediate withdrawal is likely to lead to a more difficult situation. The new approach recommends a planned withdrawal with a series of spade-work. The planning will have three components.

1) Internal: While outcome of the ongoing negotiation will depend on various variables, the two most important of them are the internal strengths of the negotiating parties and the external pressure the internal factor can generate. In our case, it is the strength of NSCN (I-M) and its capacity to hold the Naga society together including integrating (NSCN (K) and NNC) into its fold. We have witnessed during the last 60 years of our struggle how difficult it is to have solidarity/unity in Naga society. One cannot undermine the importance of unity among Nagas at this juncture. There are three options to deal with other factions:

i) Elimination of other factions: Since the signing of the Accord in 1975 and the cruel annihilation attempt by (K) in 1989, the three groups appear to be trying to eliminate each other, physically if possible. However, time has told us that this has not happened and will not happen as each group has its own support base in the society. There are also other vested interest and external forces operating taking advantage of this disunity. We have seen the worst happening now- the deepening hatred between the factions.

ii) Appeal for reconciliation with condition: In the recent times, NSCN (I-M) has tried to put the past behind and appealed to the conscience of the other two factions (NSCN (K) and NNC) of their heinous crimes of the past. It had called the other two to severe ties with the common enemy as a condition for reconciliation. While the softening of its stand of NSCN (IM) is to be appreciated, this does not appear to appeal the other two factions. Main reasons among others can be: a) the leadership of the other two factions seem to have lost vision for the Nagas. In this vision vacuum, there is no incentive for them to renounce the leadership position they are commanding in their respective factions and become subservient to the collective leadership of NSCN (I-M). On the other hand, they are enjoying the patronages of some Naga politician and the Government of India. b) This strong disincentives will not allow their already elated egos to say sorry for their past wrong doing. c) With the kind of bitterness and venoms that have been spewing at each other over the past several years, it may be very difficult for them to be convinced that the forgiveness can be genuine and there is no hook attached to it.

iii) Appeal for reconciliation without condition: While one can understand the difficulty for the collective leadership to extend unconditional reconciliation, there seems to be no other way but to recourse to this. Even this offer is unlikely to move the minds of the leaders of other factions for the reason stated above. However, it will manifest the immense strength of the collective leadership to the Naga society and will mount pressure on other factions. It is the general perception of the Naga society that in doing so no compromise of principle will be made but instead enhance the credibility of the collective leadership. The arguments for this approach are:

The ultimate goal of Naga movement is peace and rights of the Nagas to live as a nation.

Naga society is weak and this is more the reason why Nagas need to stand together.
It is the way of showing sincerity of the collective leadership and its inner strength to forgive without condition for the greater cause of the Naga people.
If the other factions still reject this offer (which is likely), their motives will be exposed and their support base will shrink.

If the collective leadership is positive that the other factions will respond to such appeal and at the same time can not help nurturing bitterness against them- still this approach is apt because ‘revenge tastes best when it is cold’.

iv) Models of reconciliation: In recent times of the world history, eleven countries have set up reconciliation commissions under various nomenclatures such as ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, ‘Reconciliation Commission’ etc. Most of these Commissions are set up within a sovereign country to reconcile the crimes perpetrated by two parties (Government on one hand and liberation forces on the other, if there is) within the country. A few including Timor Leste set up the TRC for reconciling between two countries (Indonesia and Timor Leste). Some of these Commissions are set up to investigate the crime committed by one party while in most cases (including South Africa) to investigate the crimes committed by both the parties. The Commissions are set up, of course, after the event of the crime. Irrespective of the situations they have been set up, the main intention of these commissions is political and nation building (in case of internal) and smoothening bilateral relations (in case of two independent countries). After going through all these models, it is difficult for Naga case to draw a parallel with any one of them. Two main difficulties in drawing parallel are:

There is no legal recognized state authority to set up such Commission. Thus there is no sovereign pressure on the erring parties to honour the findings of the investigation.
These reconciliations are purely political in nature, while the need to have reconciliation among all factions in Naga movement is functional and operational because we are still a struggling nation.

Reconciliation in case of the above examples is an effort to make the past become a history. Whereas, reconciliation effort in Naga struggle process will be to create history of liberation.

Unless Naga people unite and stand up as one people, Government of India will not take us seriously. We, Nagas need to find our own model for reconciliation in the interest of Naga nation.

Reconciliation process should also include our Kuki brothers living in the so called ‘Naga territory’. As one looks back, the early 1990s upheaval was a retarding factor for the movement. Whether we like it or not, Nagas and Kukis share the same future and the sooner we make the Kuki brothers realize this the better it is for both. It is necessary that being a larger and more responsible community, Nagas need to relentlessly extend good will to them and win their confidence.  I am made to understand that Kukis in Nagaland are at peace with our counterpart Naga brothers there.

v) Strategy for implementation of reconciliation:

Setting up reconciliation Commission with appropriate nomenclature:  The aim and purpose of the commission should be for peace in Nagaland in general and reconciliation among the various factions of the Naga movement.

Members: Members of the Commission should be drawn from various section of society to give fair representation and view. It should include; Hohos, Church leaders, scholars, sociologists, lawyers and of course, representatives of all factions.

While collective leadership is non-negotiable, the Commission should be given maximum leeway and space for their function including changing the very name of the organization (NSCN-IM). The change in the name of the organization may give three benefits:

Internally, it will provide space for accommodating other faction within the limits of national interest. They should not feel that their original names have been discarded in favour of the name of other faction that stuck on to its name. Factional names have become very sentimental. It is strongly felt that the name is no more so important than the cause they stand for.

Externally, the outside world will know that the Nagas have the capacity to reconcile including discarding all the older names, which are associated with factionism.

The socialists countries have nothing much to offer to us now. If the western worlds to which we look to are somewhat jittery about the name tag ‘socialists’, this is an opportunity to do so. One does not know to whom and how many time we need to explain and convince our sympathizers in the western world about this name tag.
vi) Time frame: During the last extension of cease-fire, we have claimed to have put pressure on the Government of India by making it indefinite. It should not appear to the GOI now that though no further progress is made on the core areas, the NSCN (I-M) can not afford to withdraw the cease fire because of its weakness. Therefore, the process should be immediately initiated and the mechanism put in place within six months time to have an intermittent cease fire rather than long drawn one. Another six months should be utilized to implement it. Cease-fire in future should not last more than one year (depending on the progress on the core issues). While the space for negotiation should be always kept open, unless there is tactical gain, if not substantial, no room for cease-fire is required.

vii) Preparedness of the cadre: The cadre in general and military wing in particular should be mentally and logistically prepared to go underground at any given point of time. While on one hand renewed training programme should be started immediately without arousing any suspicion of GOI, their exposure to public as well as to the government should be curtailed to pre- cease fire’ level.

Viii) Media:  The cadre’s MIP need to have foreign correspondent from its own cadre or by collaboration with other foreign media. It should be prepared to flash any untoward development in the aftermath of the withdrawal of cease-fire.

ix) Nagaland Assembly Election: With Assembly election in Nagaland only few months away now, political parties have started calibrating their positions on Naga movement issue. It will be imperative for the leadership to take maximum advantage of this situation.  While taking no sides with any political parties, they should be encouraged to come up with manifestos and minimum programme of the respective parties. They should be encouraged to demand in stronger term integration of all Naga areas. The submission of Memorandum to the GOI by six Naga MLAs and a MP from Manipur and the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee (NPCC) demand for integration of Naga areas have caused political flutter in Manipur. Sitting MLAs and MPs of Nagaland Assembly should be persuaded to send a representation to the GOI jointly or party-wise expressing unequivocally their desire for all Nagas to live under one administrative roof.

As the future of the Naga students in Manipur now hinges on the implementation of the single education board policy, political parties in Nagaland should be convinced to make commitment for extending proper facilities including conduct of examinations to the schools located in Naga areas in Manipur. The developments in the last examination and the poor pass percentage of students from Manipur have already caused resentment among the public. It is crucial time to extract all possible commitments from every single political party.

The Assembly should also demand for reverting to the1960s position and place Nagaland under Ministry of External Affairs. This will provide the tactical perspective of where the movement is moving.
2) External (with GOI):

i)             Third party negotiator: In the ongoing peace talk, the negotiator is merely a machinery of the GOI. How the demands of the Nagas are conveyed to the GOI and how much of pressure he can exert to bring an honourable solution is questionable. Therefore, the Nagas need to mount pressure on the GOI and make it clear that Nagas need a third party negotiator in order to have a meaningful peace negotiation. The Acheh Peace Deal in Indonesia was negotiated by no less than former Finish President. After several rounds of talks that began in January 2005, it ended in a Peace Deal in August in the same year. Involvement of a negotiator from a third country did not neither necessarily act against the interest of the government nor met GAM’s demands disproportionately, but is more acceptable to GAM and the settlement itself is supposedly more objective. Liberation Tamil Tiger Elam (LTTE) had a Norwegian negotiating for them.

ii)             Core issues: The Nagas should make it clear to GOI that, as a sign for forward movement of the talk government should begin with the territorial integration. As the government will be reluctant to move forward, collective leadership should request the GOI for an opportunity to address its parliament to present the case of the Nagas. Though
Parliament is open to only sovereign country; India has once opened it for Yaser Arafat. The collective leadership should clearly indicate that if GOI continues to dilly dally on the core issues any longer, it will ensure that all the GOI’s efforts on Look East policy through norteast end up in smoke.

iii). Second referendum: Political situation has become very volatile in the after math of the India-US nuclear deal. Mid-term poll is expected very soon. The Nagas should organize one more referendum confirming the support of Naga society to the Naga movement for self-determination. To avoid unwanted attraction of the government, it should be called ‘opinion poll’ and held simultaneously side by side with the general election.  Foreign media if possible or at least favourable Indian media should facilitate the opinion poll.
3. External Diplomacy (the World)

i) There is a dire need to have a negotiator from a sympathetic country to the cause of the Nagas.

ii) Prior to withdrawal of cease-fire, all international human right groups/organizations should be alerted so that they can follow closely the excesses of the Indian army on Naga population following any possible showdown between Nagas Army and Government army. The MIP and its media tie ups should constantly feed the news to the foreign media when ever there is such show of strength.

iii) Nagas should be actively involved and should work closely with other organizations in India in the indigenous peoples movement.
4.  While insurgency problem in the entire North east is something to worry about, Naga issue alone as it stands now is not a heavyweight political issue for GOI. Forming a common united front of all the North East groups will send shiver down the spine of GOI. In the early 1980s, we have lost several friends because of our purist stand.
VIII.     Conclusion:

The able Naga leadership has provided vision for its people. And because of this vision, though precious bloods have been shed and lives lost, the Naga movement still moves on. In this process of nation building, unfortunately, treacheries have been committed which do not deserve pardon. However, the need of forgiving each other and the need to forgive the murderer of ones own brother is not so much relevant as at this juncture of the Naga history.  More so because we are Christian. It is hard for an ordinary man as I am to practice forgiveness without condition. But surely, one man has to redeem the nation through forgiveness.

Nagas as a people are confused today. While some are sinking in the wealth of its enemies, others have been living in the periphery of other people for the last 60 years with worsening condition. On the other hand, the strengths of the enemy have increased manifolds. Time seems to be running out. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to have a settlement on equal terms.  But surely there has to be a honourable settlement because we are God’s people.

Nagas of Manipur – Problems and way forward

The Naga movement has been sustained because of the vision of few leaders who envision a future for the Naga people.  During the course of this struggle over the decades, however, it has been observed that majority of the Naga people do not seem to share the one vision. Going by the rhetoric- the voices raised everywhere for Naga cause, Naga unity, Naga future, Naga identity etc., there can be no doubt that Naga patriotism is exemplary. However, in reality, it has become more and more obvious that the spirit of unity, the shared vision is only a farce and if there is any, has frizzled out much faster than one realizes. While some part of Nagalim is dipping deep into the wealth, others have been in the periphery for the last 60 years, deprived, dejected and with little hope for betterment in the future. It is in this context this paper has been proposed.

The greatest enemy of the naga nation as time and the unfolding events have been telling is not any outside force but is within us. Some interested politicians have very subtlety cultivated their own constituencies. In creation of Nagaland State as a political entity in the midst of political struggle of the nagas, the vision of nagas as a nation nose-dived and the flow of events after that have been proving this point.

It is time to ask ourselves how closer we have come to the goal then we were 60 years ago. Although, the movement has made progress in various fronts, it seems to be stepping back in several other aspects.  The most worrying factor being the internal problem. Naga unity, which is supposed to be the foundation from which strength should emanate, seems to have gone from bad to worse. In view of all these developments, collective leadership would need to do a serious re-thinking so that the situation does not slip further. The goalpost being given and non-negotiable, it is felt imperative to change the rule or strategy of the game. Insertion of short term and medium term in the hierarchy of ultimate goal, it is felt, will provide the much needed maneuvering space and a chewable piece for every single bite.

Hurtles in territorial integration

The recommendations and suggestions in this paper flow from the assumption that the current approach to forge Naga unity has been confronted with many administrative, systemic and strategic difficulties namely, i) Creation of Nagaland State- a legal entity-with artificial boundary was the first beating that Naga national movement got ii) over the years some local interested politicians have cultivated their constituencies which has become all pervasive now, iii) Nagaland State as a legal entity has become a convenient political handle for the GOI to thwart any effort for Naga integration or unity, iv) The people of Nagaland has immensely benefited from Naga political movement, and v) local politicians want a status co, vi) that politicians in Nagaland State, perhaps, consider merger with the territories from Manipur, Assam and Arunachal more a liability than gain, vii) Dominant tribes and politicians in Nagaland State would wish to continue their domination.  Merger with territories from other three States has the high possibility of diluting this domination in future.

Let me be honest to admit my ignorance of Nagaland internal politics. My interaction with naga brothers of Nagaland is also minimal. But the above observation flow from the flow of event since the signing of 16 points agreement in the early 1960s. And I don’t blame them. Because this is the natural course of the intention of the Indian policy makers and it must flow its full course of the design the agreement.

A simple example in this context is the recent development with regard to School Board affiliation issue. The dilly-dally in the Nagaland Assembly is only a political gambit. Amending the byelaw of the Nagaland School Education Board rather than placing it before the Assembly to enact a law is seen by many as political calculation of DAN government which would like to be seen as a strong advocate for merger/unity. The only one thing high in the agenda of DAN government is, of course the Assembly election which they won. Sincerity of the Government of Nagaland will be proved only when it is enacted as a law and start conducting examinations in the recognized schools in the districts of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal. It can be almost vouched that this will not happen in future.

On the other hand, Nagas living in Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh have gone through the bitter experience of historical neglect and marginalisation. While the other communities are taking advantage of the modernization process and making tremendous progress, Nagas in these states are decades behind them and with no glimpse of hope in near future.

In view of this, a well thought out political measures need to be taken to curve out a space for ourselves without impinging on the ultimate goal of Naga National Movement. If Nagas in their respective states make progress, in long term, difficulties faced in the process of our effort for unity as mentioned above may be addressed. Since largest number of Naga population outside Nagaland is in Manipur and because Manipur State is the biggest hurdle to the merger issue, it will not be illogical to start some effort from Manipur State.
Background of Meiteis-Tribals relationship

The relationship of meiteis with other groups particularly the hill people is worth analyzing. The history of Meitei, though rich in records of assimilating hill people at the individual level, has no substantial evidence of en masse absorption of other groups into the mainstream of Meitei society. As evidenced from historical records it is beyond doubt that the Meitei kings carried out frequent raids on different hill peoples and collected tribute from their chiefs who also made counter attacks to the Meitei kings. The history of the relationship of the Meitei with the neighboring hill tribes centered around the frequent wars fought between the Meitei Kings and the Chief of hill tribes. However, the Meitei kings were always at the upper hand. Such an historical reality has paved the way for establishment of the conveners-convenored relationship between the Meiteis and the hill people. In the long process of history the value of this relationship has been inculcated in the mind of the people and the majority group has possessed the historically derived superiority that has been expressed in the form of cultural arrogance.

When the Meiteis became the followers of Vaishnavism, this historically given cultural arrogance sharpened and further alienated the non-Hindu tribals. The tribes, who have embraced Christianity, on the other hand also have alienated themselves from the Meiteis. This social gap resulted from the mutual alienation become wider and wider with the metamorphosis of the colonial subjects into free citizens of independent India became political democratization has stimulated primordial sentiments.

Cultural arrogance and domination is being perpetuated even more today not in terms of carrying out frequent raids and collection of tributes but by systematically depriving the hill people of the developments due to them. In the given power equation scenario in the state, this exploitation will be allowed to continue.

It may be, therefore, noted here that though Meiteis and nagas have long relationship it has never been a common and shared history. It has been rather more of dominant and dominated relation and one of conflict than cordial relationship benefiting only the dominant community. History has its natural course and in the majority-minority dynamics, this course has not change and is unlikely to change in future.  Simply put, nagas do not have a common future with meiteis.
Concerns/Issues in Manipur

General/political: The Meiteis of Manipur have never been comfortable with the aspiration of Naga people to live under one political roof.  In the past, they have reacted sharply when such efforts were made, one in 1964- the first cease-fire between GOI and Nagas- when it was extended to some districts in Manipur. In the most recent incident, when the ongoing cease-fire was extended to hill districts of Manipur in 2001, there was furor in Manipur resulting in ultimate withdrawal of this extension. That it was the machination of the GOI is entirely different issue. The contention of the Meiteis is that Manipur’s political boundary has been intact since 1834 when Kabaw valley was transferred to Burma. Simply put, this conflict can be understood in the context of territorial claims postulated by both the nagas and the Meiteis in their construct of separate ‘Nation states’.  It is a direct result of the ongoing pan- naga political struggle for unified nagalim and on the other hand the assertion of ethnic supremacy and glorification of a golden past by the section of dominant meiteis.

Insecurity of the meiteis springs from the fact that the four valley districts make up only a little more than 20% of the entire territory of the State. Any decision of the GOI to merge hill territories of Manipur with Nagaland will, therefore, i) leave Meitei with political uncertainty, ii) legal entity of Manipur will be uncertain, iii) Meiteis will lose out huge amount of funds which they have been enjoying in the name of the tribal populations, iv) there will be political turmoil in the entire region. The Meiteis are likely to fight out till the last. One wonders if GOI will risk this situation when the going of the present policy is so far so good.
Manipur Land Revenue Act (1960)

It is also to be noted with serious concern that the Manipur Land Revenue Act (1960) has been on the threshold of expansion into the hill areas. It is a fact that around 70 villages of Churachanpur District, some parts in Tamenglong District and a large junk of Kangpokpi areas have already been affected by this Act. Neeedless to say that there is a constitutional safeguard against the expansion of this Act to hill areas. However, this constitutional safeguard is in nowhere to prevent the expansion of this Act beyond its jurisdiction. It will not be a surprise that after a few decades most of the hill areas would have come under this Act. By then it will be too late to undo all that has crept in illusively spread over decades.


Status Co: The first option to approach the above situation is to continue the current approach i.e demanding upfront for territorial integration of all Naga areas. However, it has been observed that this approach has not borne much fruit and no softening in the stance of the GOI in term of giving serious thought to it is foreseeable in future. In fact, this somewhat undoable thing in the mind frame of India policy maker is evident from the dilly-tallying tactics of the GOI in the last more than a decade. Where the GOI wishes Naga movement to go has been briefly dealt with in my previous paper.

The most recent assurance reportedly given to Manipur outer constituency MP, Hon’ble Mr. Mani that the UPA Government will re-examine the UPA common minimum programme to remove one of its programmes that it would respect the territorial integrity of the existing state is but only a political exercise to swim though the Confidence Motion.

Option two: Demand a separate status for the hill districts of Manipur. This may be in the form of separate Union territory or separate State but in any case not less than Union Territory.


A. i. For State and GoI : Such move will bring directly into loggerhead with the Meiteis. Meiteis know that this kind of demand is inevitable in future. Precisely because of this reason, they are surreptitiously expanding the Manipur Land Revenue Act to hill districts. On the other hand as a part of tribals appeasement policy, they have announced a toothless District Council. Unfortunately, we have bitten the bait at the first instance by jumping into the election fray from all corners.

ii. GOI of India will sit up to see this with immense interest. It is worthwhile to recall the newspapers report that NSCN (I-M) is ready to negotiate for Union territory status. It was not just a thoughtless speak by the negotiator but a well-calculated articulation. It may be read in two ways a) GoI would like to know the reaction of the NSCN. Now that NSCN is so weakened (so they think) with the splinter groups within the cadre, it would like to somewhat expect NSCN softening its stance. b) If the NSCN maintains its hard-line and sticks to its guns then, it would like to pre-empt any such move from the civilian side. GoI would not easily cede any kind of political concessions to Naga/Tribals of Manipur short of making it a part of negotiation deal with NSCN (I-M). On the other hand, GoI also understands the agitative nerves of the tribal population against the majority Meities.

B.i. For NSCN:  It is a political taboo for NSCN to speak of separate state for the Naga/tribals within the constitution of India. Mizos’ case is a precedent that had just happened yesterday and it is a political suicide to step into the same trap. In another word, this process will dilute the greater cause of the Naga movement. I recall that a few decades ago, NSCN has objected even to the tribals demanding for 6th schedule status saying that it will dilute the greater goal of the movement. I am wondering today, why it has not raised any objection to the much more toothless District Council proposed for the hill districts today.

ii. All other factions of Naga movement including NSCN (K), NNC and some other interested elements will raise a hue and cry finger pointing at collective leadership that it is a complete sell out and that they have been anticipating this since the 1989 split.

iii. Chairman of NSCN (I-M) may also raise his serious doubts on the intention of the movement.

iv. The intelligence department of the GOI will try to take full advantage of this and try further to split and undermine the cadre.


Nagas in Manipur can not affort to live on in the present condition under the complete domination of meiteis. While on the other hand, the demand for territorial integration by the NSCN does not seem to be happening anywhere near future, territorial domination of the meitei is slowly but surely spreading over the hill districts in the form of MLRA. It is therefore, imperative that a necessary legal precaution needs to be taken. As continuation under one administrative roof will only ensure perpetuation of domination of the valley people, a strategy that will ultimately separate administration of the hill area and the valley of Manipur need to be evolved. It will be worthwhile to note that while initiating this process at the public level, other non- naga tribes should be taken into confidence.

The option of demanding a separate administrative unit exclusively for the tribals of Manipur is the most viable short term as well as long term strategy. That it will dilute the greater cause is a complete misgiving for the following reasons: a) Nagaland State had been already created. The emotional barrier we have today between the nagas of Nagaland and other nagas is due to this artificial boundary. Adding another Administrative State for nagas will only help bridge the gulf between the brethren of these two states. This will be enumerated at the later stage. b) This movement will be solely at the public/ civilian level. C) Any political struggle process involves short term measures which will uplift the overall condition of the people. For example, during the Indian freedom struggle, several Acts were passed at the behest of INC to bring reforms within the colonial structure to ameliorate the political, social and economic lives of people although the ultimate is independence.  The political reforms introduced did not in any case dilute the ultimate goal of the struggle. In fact, it concretizes the ultimate goal and therefore, laid the very foundation of Independent India.

i. Short term benefits: a) This will immediately redress the issue of discrimination and marginalization of tribal by the meiteis. b) This will provide some kind of vision for the middle rung cadre who can not share the ultimate vision of the top leadership.  Several small splinter groups that have come up in recent times seem to be the result of murky vision. They will have something immediate to fight for. It may be clarified here that this movement will be solely spearheaded by public/ civilians. However, this process must have the blessing of the leadership.
ii. Medium term benefit: The difficulties associated with the effort of territorial integration have been explained earlier. This involves both political and economic dimensions. Reiterating the points emphasized above, therefore, in short term measure, there is nothing for the nagas of Nagaland to gain as politically integration will eat into their political space. They also see integration through economic prism in terms of sharing more of their booties than benefiting from it. Therefore, though the rhetoric of integration and unity will be apparently maintained, there will be unlikely any serious efforts toward this goal.

Creating a separate political entity for the nagas of South will, therefore, go a long way in the process of integration process for the following reason:
i. Having a territorial entity of our own will raise the bargaining power with our brothers in nagaland. It will not be a move for integration of naga territory of Manipur with the territory of Nagaland but integration of two entities-an amalgamation.

ii. This will clear the constitutional hurdle of having consent of the States concerned for merger to create a bigger one political entity. It will be then that the sincerity of nagas from nagaland will be tested.
Strategy: As much as scoring goal is not a matter of one long shoot from one goal post to another, there is a need to have several steps if needs be to achieving this goal. For one should be fully prepared for a long drawn battle.
i. Demand for separate Hill Education Board.

ii. Demand for separate Hill University.

iii. Demand for separate Land Revenue and Forest Act for the hill areas.

iv. And, ultimately, demand for separate union territory/State

v. It should have an inclusive approach. It is important to note that right from the inception of this process other non- naga tribes should be taken into confidence. It will be suicidal on our part to commit the same mistake of the early 1990s.

I have tried to present in this paper a case which may not be the best but viable given the current scenario. While the GOI is fully aware that it will not be possible for it to completely wipe out the naga movement as in the case of Tamil tigers,  reducing it to the level where it will have no strength to stand up as a united force is all what it desires. It may worthwhile to realize that we are dealing with a formidable force in terms of diplomacy, policy, strategy, and military and economic strength. In face of all these, there an absolute need to deal with the problem of the process in phased manner. The strategies enumerated above will provide a space for development to keep pace with the development of the world, add strength to the civilians to support the movement, provide vision to the middle rung leadership, evoke deference from our Nagaland brethrens and will not diffuse the ultimate goal of the movement.

source: UNPO